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Adoption and insertion of new technologies and processes into systems is 
inherently risky.  A cost model that forecasts the cost of risk associated with inserting 
new technology into a system has been developed.  The model projects the cost of 
inserting new processes, projects the impact of the processes on the cost of risk for 
the system, and performs a cost-benefit analysis on the adoption of proposed new 
processes.  The projected cost of failure consequences (PCFC) is defined as the cost 
of all failure events (of varying severity) that are expected to occur over the service 
life of the system.  The PCFC is uncertain, and the potential positive impact of 
adopting new technologies into the system is to reduce the cost of risk and/or reduce 
its uncertainty.  A case study that assesses the adoption of a lead-free solder control 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Failure is defined as “The inability of a system or component to perform its 
required functions within specified performance requirements” (IEEE 1991).  A 
failure event can be characterized by two measures: the likelihood that the event will 
occur and the consequences (i.e., cost associated with the event) that are realized 
when the event happens.  In this context, the factors of likelihood and occurrence 
outline the risk associated with a failure.  Design engineers often think in terms of 
minimizing the likelihood of a failure, but how can the benefits to reducing the 
chances of a failure event occurring be quantified?  Inherently, if the likelihood of 
failure is reduced, fewer failure events will occur, and the owner of the product or 
system will avoid spending money on mitigating the effects of the failures that have 
been prevented, but reducing the likelihood of failure is not free.   
 The goal of this thesis is to develop a model to analyze the cost implications, 
good or bad, of adopting new technology (or processes) in safety-critical systems.  
Will the new technology increase the safety and reliability of the system?  If so, will 
the adopted technologies be cost effective, so that the reduction in the cost of risk is 
greater than the cost to adopt the new technology?  Conversely, if the adoption of the 
new technology or processes is mandated (by customers or regulations), what are the 









The IEEE’s Standard Computer Dictionary defines reliability as "The ability 
of a system or component to perform its required functions under stated conditions 
for a specified period of time” (IEEE 1991).  Quality is defined as “The degree to 
which a system, component, or process meets specified requirements” or “The degree 
to which a system, component, or process meets customer or user needs or 
expectations” (IEEE 1991).  The key difference between reliability and quality is that 
reliability includes a measure of time, whereas quality is assessed at a specific point 
in time (often the conclusion of the manufacturing process).   
1.2 Cost of Quality Methods and Models 
 
First, consider models used to calculate the cost of quality.  How engineers 
calculate the cost of quality of a product has been in flux for the past half century.  
One of the most well-known models was first developed by Feigenbaum (1956) and 
divides quality costs into three entities: prevention cost, appraisal cost, and failure 
cost (P-A-F).  The P-A-F model has been adopted by the American Society for 
Quality and is widely used in industry.  In the P-A-F model, failure costs are often 
divided into internal failure costs: those costs that are dealt with before the product 
has reached the customer, and external failure costs: those costs that arise from 
defects that occur after the product has reached the customer (Vaxevanidis 2008).  
Thus, the goal of the P-A-F model is to determine the level of quality that minimizes 
the total cost of quality, i.e. the sum of prevention, appraisal, and internal and external 




Crosby (1979) takes a similar approach, defining the cost of quality as the sum 
of the Price of Conformance (PoC) and the Price of Non-Conformance (PoNC).  PoC 
is the cost of ensuring a product meets performance requirements, and PoNC is the 
cost the manufacturer of the product incurs when a product fails to meet performance 
requirements.  In Cosby’s model the optimal cost of quality is defined by the defect 
rate that produces the lowest combined costs of PoC and PoNC.   
Crosby and Feigenbaum’s models assume that there exists an optimal (greater 
than zero), percentage of defective products that results in the optimal (lowest) cost of 
quality.  Hence, according to Crosby and Feigenbaum it could be more cost effective 
to design a lower quality product.  Deming (1986) breaks from Crosby and 
Feigenbaum by asserting that the best way to optimize the cost of quality is to strive 
to eliminate all defects.  Deming argues that since the cost of selling defective 
products to the customer is inevitably so high, and compounded by difficult to 
measure metrics such as loss of reputation, companies should strive for 100% non-
defective products.   
Activity Based Costing (ABC) has also been incorporated into some cost of 
quality models.  Tsai (1998) states that ABC can be incorporated into P-A-F model to 
better estimate overhead costs in prevention and appraisal activities.  In Tsai’s ABC 
approach, activities are divided into: value-added activities, those that directly 
contribute to customer satisfaction, and non-value-added activities, those that do not 
directly contribute to customer satisfaction.  In Tsai’s model, prevention activities are 




The ABC methodology suggests eliminating non-value-added activities and spending 
more money on improving value-added activities.   
Another method to calculate the effective cost of quality is to calculate yielded 
cost.  Becker and Sandborn state “Yielded cost, in general, is described as cost 
divided by yield” (Becker and Sandborn 2001), where yield is the fraction of non-
defective products.  Therefore, the yielded cost per good part is higher than the unit 
cost of each part, as the yielded cost takes into account defective parts that cost 
money to create, but generate no value.   
The models discussed in this section focus on attaching a value to 
manufacturing quality, i.e., the quality of the product when it completes the 
manufacturing process.  These models do not assess the value of product quality over 
time (i.e., reliability). 
The Taguchi Loss Function is a method of calculating the loss due to 
increased variation in a product.  Taguchi’s equations state that the loss increases as 
product variation increases (Taguchi 1995).   
1.3 Cost of Reliability Methods and Models 
 
The cost of reliability is, in essence, the cost of quality over time.  Sears 
developed a cost of reliability model by defining “development of unreliability in a 
product and the costs of correcting the unreliability” (Sears 1991).  Sears focuses on 
the money spent to remove defects from the system.  Sears assumes the failure rate of 
the system is proportional to the number of defects in the system and that by 




Barringer defines reliability as “the odds for failure free operation during a 
given interval…” (Barringer 1997).  Thus, Barringer defines the cost of reliability as 
those costs that are used to keep the system free from failure, and the benefits of those 
costs are improved availability, decreased downtime and maintenance costs, and 
decreased secondary failure costs (Barringer 1991).  Barringer explores how different 
maintenance practices impact the system life-cycle cost and reliability, and finds that 
good maintenance practices, such as fixing broken parts and other parts that have 
little remaining life, are more cost effective than only fixing broken parts when 
performing maintenance.    
Hauge defines risk as “the product of the severity of a failure and the 
probability of that failure’s occurrence” (Hauge 2001).  Failures are ranked based on 
severity and likelihood of occurrence.  Each failure is given a severity rating and 
occurrence rating of 1-5, with 5 being the worst.  The severity and occurrence ratings 
are multiplied together to give a total magnitude of the risk due to the failure.  Hague 
states that this method was used to manage risks of potential failures on the space 
shuttle and keeps risks below and acceptable level.   
Perera and Holsomback also describe a NASA risk management approach in 
depth.  NASA’s goal is to prioritize risks based on likelihood and severity, with equal 
weight given to both factors.  Perera and Holsomback state that risks can be identified 
from “fault-tree analysis results, failure modes and effects  analysis (FMEA) results, 
test data, expert opinion, brainstorming, hazard analysis, lessons learned from other 
project/programs, technical analysis or trade studies and other resources H” (Perera 




Sun et al. (2012) describe a software cost of reliability model that incorporates 
the severity level of failures.  Sun et al. claim that the risk from a defect in software 
depends on both the failure rate of the defect and the severity level of the defect.  
According to Sun et al., the risk of a defect is defined as “the expected loss if [the 
defect] remains in the released software” (Sun et al. 2012).  The total cost of risk of 
the program is the sum of all the expected losses due to all defects in the system.  
Then, Sun et al. compares the estimated reduction cost of risk with the cost of testing 
software for defects and reviewing the tests.   
1.4 Cost of Risk 
 
 Another cost measure is the cost of risk.  Liu and Boggs, in their paper on 
cable life and the cost of risk, define the cost of risk as “the cost to a utility associated 
with early cable failure” and the cost of failure as “the cost to replace the cable” (Liu 
and Boggs 2009).  The cost of failure varies depending on how difficult it is to 
replace the cable as direct-buried cables are more difficult and expensive to replace 
than cables in a duct, for example.  Hence, Liu and Boggs define the cost of risk as 
the cost of those failures that are early, that is those that occur before the end of the 
service life of the product.   
1.5 Problem Statement 
 
 Consider a company that makes a product and has the option to adopt new 
technology, processes or methods into its business practices.  These new technologies 




onboarding one or more of the technologies.  In other words, the company pays 
additional money upfront, but the benefit of these costs will not be realized until 
several years after the product has been in service.  The obvious question here is: will 
adopting one or more of these technologies be cost-effective over the product’s life 
cycle?  In this instance life cycle of a product is the time period starting with its 
manufacture through the end of its service life.  The problem can be concisely framed 
as: 
 
Determine the life-cycle cost of a system associated with the adoption of a 
combination of technologies, processes and/or methodologies, where the 
adoption may be mandated and the life-cycle cost ramifications include the 
projected cost of failure consequences (PCFC). The best combination will be the 
most cost-effective combination that satisfies the system owner’s reliability 
requirements.   
 
 In order to solve this problem, several things have to be done: first, calculate 
the current, pre-technology insertion, cost of risk for the system, second, determine 
the cost of inserting the selected technologies, third, calculate how the new 
technology will impact the cost of risk during the entire service life of the product, 
and finally, determine with a given level of confidence that inserting the new 
technology will or will not be cost effective.  
 There are several issues with applying the existing cost of quality models to 




for multiple types, and severities, of failure.  Although all non-conforming parts may 
entail negative consequences and costs for the system owner, all non-conformities are 
not necessarily equal.  Second, the Crosby and Feigenbaum models do not account 
for failures during the service life of the product, in other words they deal with 
quality, but not reliability.     
Also, the existing models do not include decision making parameters for 
technology insertion.  While the Crosby and Feigenbaum models may be able to 
outline the general ideas one would use for calculating the cost of risk for a given 
system, one would need a decision making framework in order to solve the 
technology insertion problem, a framework that would outline the cost benefits, and 
uncertainties with adopting new technology or practices into a system.  
Finally, none of the existing models attach uncertainty to risk.  It is intuitive 
that when calculating the cost of risk due to failures that have a probability of 
occurring, there will be an uncertainty attached to the calculated cost.  It would be 
useful to have a model that could include uncertainty as part of its calculation and 
then make a business case for adopting or not adopting the technology with a level of 
confidence.   
In summary, the existing models provide the foundations and fundamental 
ideas for calculating the cost of risk, but in order to develop a model that could 
readily be applied to solve the technology insertion problem, much work remains to 





1.6 Research Plan and Tasks 
 
 In order to develop and test the new model, the following steps have been 
performed: 
1. Carefully define the technology adoption problem and state assumptions.   
2. Conduct a comprehensive survey on work already completed in fields such as 
risk analysis, cost of quality, and others.  Analyze the current body of 
knowledge and determine if it can solve the problem.  If it cannot, identify 
what must be developed in a new model to solve the technology adoption 
problem.   
3. Develop a model to solve the technology adoption problem.   
4. Test the model and determine its applicability by using it to perform case 
studies in relevant fields.   
5. Analyze the completed model and the case study.  Determine the strengths 
and weaknesses of the model and identify future to further improve the 





Chapter 2: The Technology Insertion Cost of Risk Model 
 
 This chapter describes in detail how the technology insertion cost of risk 
model is formulated.  First, the primary sources that served as a background for 
portions of the architecture of the model are discussed, and then the model is 
described.  Additionally, potential sources of data for the model are described, 
including how best to interpret the data for use in the model. 
   
2.1 Calculating the Projected Cost of Failure Consequences (PCFC) 
 
The first task of this model is to calculate the Projected Cost of Failure 
Consequences (PCFC) for the fleet of products that the model is analyzing.  In this 
thesis, PCFC is defined as the cost that the fleet owner expects to incur over the 
service life of the product due to failures of members of the fleet.  We assume that the 
system owner is under contract requiring the system to operate for a set amount of 
time, for example 20 years of service, so each field failure must be met with 
corrective action to keep the fleet of products performing.  Failure costs include but 
are not limited to warranty costs, cost of repairing failed units, cost of replacing failed 
units, and loss of performance due to system downtime.  PCFC includes both 
damages that result from failure events (damage to property, loss of life, delays in 
schedule), and repair or maintenance costs to return the system to operating condition 
so it can carry out the remainder of its service life.   
Systems can fail in different ways, and all failures do not necessarily have the 




maintenance (repair) might cost less than a failure that is so severe that the system 
owner must replace the unit.  The system owner needs to predict the cost of all the 
failure events that are expected to occur over the life of the fleet of products, taking 
into account that those products can fail multiple times, in multiple ways, and with 
different financial consequences of failure depending how the product fails.   
Taubel (2006) calculates a total mishap cost by plotting the known costs 
associated with mishaps versus the probability of mishap for different severities of 
mishap (e.g., Figure 1), and then determining the area under the curve connecting the 
points.  In Taubel’s study, the definition of mishap derives from the Department of 
Defense’s Military Standard 882C: “An unplanned event or series of events resulting 
in death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, 
or damage to the environment.” (Mil-STD-882C 1979).  Note that while Taubel’s 
model works with mishaps, the model developed in this thesis is built around failures, 
as defined by the IEEE standard dictionary (IEEE 1991).  In the Taubel model, each 
severity level of a mishap has a distinct cost and an associated probability of 
occurrence of the mishap.  For example, Taubel defines a severity 3 failure as a 
failure that will cost $10,000-$100,000 to resolve.  Taubel demonstrates his model 
using past marathon injury data to predict the future severity (cost) and likelihood of 
occurrence of various injuries.  In his example a severity level 3 failure would be one 
where a runner is sent to the hospital but does not have to be admitted.  The area 
under the line defined by the severity levels of failure is the expected mishap cost for 







Figure 1: The multiple severity method (Taubel 2006) 
 
A model similar to Taubel’s multiple severity method is used in this thesis to 
determine the overall cost of mishaps for a product before and after mitigation 
activities are used.  A mitigation activity is a process that may reduce the overall 
expected number of mishaps at certain severity levels.  Each mitigation activity is 
assumed to affect a specified set of severity levels and does not change the probability 
of a failure for the other severity levels.  For example, to prevent mishap events from 
occurring during a marathon, one might fill potholes in the road prior to the race; this 
impacts the probability of occurrence of mishaps due to runners tripping (e.g., 
sprained ankles or broken legs), but has no impact on the probability of mishaps such 
as heat exhaustion or heart attacks.   
The model in this thesis calculates expected number of failures at each 
severity level rather than calculating the probability of failure at each severity level.  
It does so because some failures that may occur more than once during the life of the 





2.2 The Source of PCFC Data 
 
An important consideration for the implementation of a cost of risk model is 
how to obtain data about a system, i.e., the ways a system can fail, and the cost and 
likelihood of occurrence of those failures.  One source of this data is a Failure Modes, 
Mechanisms, and Effects Analysis (FMMEA) report.  A FMMEA categorizes failure 
events and assigns each event a rating for its severity and likelihood of occurrence.  
Also, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or a Failure Modes Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) could also be used a source of data on the severities 
and frequencies of the ways a system could fail.  A FMEA is very similar to a 
FMMEA, except that a FMEA does not analyze the mechanisms associated with each 
failure.  Additionally, a FMECA is an extension of a FMMEA that includes a 
criticality analysis.
1
    
For example, the Army’s “Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) Manual for Command, Control, Communications, Computer Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Facilities” is one example of how a FMMEA or 
FMECA can be used as a source of data on failure severities and occurrence rates 
(MIL-STD-882C 1993).  Tables 1 and 2 show the Army’s ten severity and occurrence 
ratings respectively.  In a FMECA report, each failure a system could experience 
would be assigned failure severity and occurrence ratings from these scales.   
 
                                                          
1
 Criticality analysis is a method of prioritizing failures after each failure is assigned a severity and 




Table 1: Army severity rankings, reproduced from (TM 5-698-4 2006) 
Ranking Effect Comment 
1 None 
No reason to expect failure to 
have any effect on Safety, Health, 
Environment or Mission. 
2 Very Low 
Minor disruption to facility 
function.  Repair to failure can be 
accomplished during trouble call. 
3 Low 
Minor disruption to facility 
function. Repair to failure may be 
longer than trouble call but does 




Moderate disruption to facility 
function. Some portion of 
Mission may need to be reworked 
or process delayed. 
5 Moderate 
Moderate disruption to facility 
function. 100% of Mission may 





Moderate disruption to facility 
function. Some portion of 
Mission is lost.  Moderate delay 
in restoring function. 
7 High  
High disruption to facility 
function. Some portion of 
Mission is lost. Significant delay 
in restoring function. 
8 Very High 
High disruption to facility 
function. All of Mission is lost. 
Significant delay in restoring 
function. 
9 Hazard 
Potential Safety, Health or 







Potential Safety, Health or 




Table 2: Army occurrence ratings, reproduced from (TM 5-698-4 2006) 
 
Ranking Failure Rate Comment 
1 1/10,000 Remote probability of 
occurrence; unreasonable to 
expect failure to occur 
2 1/5,000 Very low failure rate. Similar 
to past design that has, had 
low failure rates for given 
volume/loads 
3 1/2,000 Low failure rate based on 
similar design for given 
volume/loads 
4 1/1,000 Occasional failure rate. Similar 
to past design that has had 
similar failure rates for given 
volume/loads 
5 1/500 Moderate failure rate.  Similar 
to past design having moderate 
failure rates for given 
volume/loads 
6 1/200 Moderate to high failure rate.  
Similar to past design having 
moderate failure rates for 
given volume/loads 
7 1/100 High failure rate.  Similar to 
past design having frequent 




8 1/50 High failure rate.  Similar to 
past design having frequent 
failures that caused problems 
9 1/20 Very high failure rate.  Almost 
certain to cause problems 
10 1/10+ Very high failure rate.  Almost 




2.3 Technology Insertion Cost of Risk Model 
 
 Next we describe the model itself.  An overview of the steps in the model is 





Figure 2: Modeling Steps 
 
The model’s first task is to organize the given failure data.  Let’s say that the 
user wants to analyze a system composed of electric parts.  Before the PCFC can be 
calculated, each relevant failure must be identified and described by: the part affected 
by the failure, and by the failure mode, cause, and mechanism associated with an 
occurrence of that failure.  An example of the data for four failures associated with 
three types of parts is shown in Table 3, which shows, in this example, that capacitors 
are associated with two distinct failure types while resistors and inductors are only 




Table 3: Sample part-specific failure data 
 
 
 Additionally, each failure is described by a severity level and an occurrence 
factor, each of which correspond to a numerical value of the cost associated with an 
occurrence of the failure and the expected number of failures to occur over the service 
life of the product.   
 Next, the number of failures expected to occur over the service life of the 
product at each severity level are calculated.  The collective expected number of 
failures for each severity level is called the severity level profile in the model.  At this 
stage in the modeling process we are creating the initial severity level profile, as no 
activities, options the user could choose to implement to reduce the likelihood of 
failure, have been considered yet.  A sample severity level profile is shown in Table 




Table 4: Number of Failures Expected to Occur at each Severity Level 
 
 
The calculation of the expected number of failures per product per unit lifetime for 
each distinct severity level is given by equation (1): 
                   ∑   
 
                    (1) 
where: 
f = Expected number of failures per product per unit lifetime 
i = Severity level under consideration 
n = Number of failures of severity level i 
 
2.4 Using the System Failure Data to Determine the Initial PCFC 
 
 Now, let’s use the data obtained from a FMMEA to calculate the PCFC.  Each 
failure the system can experience is described by two characteristics: the severity of 
failure and the frequency of occurrence of that failure.  FMMEAs or FMECAs are 
great sources of data on the ways a product or system can failure, the relative 




we mean the cost of the actions that the system or product owner will have to take to 
correct or compensate for the effects of a failure after it has occurred.   
 Most FMMEAs in use today qualitatively describe severity and frequency of 
failure, whereas to be used in this mathematical model each failure’s severity and 
frequency must be quantitatively defined, so that each failure has a severity and 
frequency describing it that tell us: 1) the expected cost that the system owner will 
incur for every instance of the occurrence of that failure, and 2) the number of times 
the failure is expected to occur over the service life of the system.  As shown in Table 
3, the right-most columns are the assigned values for the expected cost of each failure 
and the number of failures to occur.   
 For example, in the FMMEA used for the case study in the next chapter of this 
thesis, severity of failure is rated on a scale of 1-5, with a severity 1 failure defined as 
a minor nuisance and a severity 5 failure defined as a catastrophic failure.  But, each 
of these severities must be assigned a specific cost associated with an occurrence of 
that severity.  Note that this cost is the average expected cost, as we assume that the 
cost of a certain severity of failure will be the same every time the failure occurs.  
This cost may also have uncertainty associated with it.  Likewise the FMMEA used in 
the case study describes the frequency of failure on a qualitative scale of 1-4, with 
frequency 1 failures described as low and frequency level 5 failures described as 
frequent.  To be used in the model, each frequency rating needs to be translated into 
an expected number of times that failure will occur over the lifetime of the product.  




Table 5: Example conversion of qualitative FMMEA ratings to quantitative 
ratings 
 
 It is up to the system owner how to transform FMMEA ratings to numerical 
values of cost and expected number of failures.  The cost associated with a certain 
severity of failure and expected number of failures for a given frequency rating could 
vary based on several factors including: operating conditions, the context the system 
is being used in, and the length of the service life.  In the example outlined by Table 
5, the conversion was performed with an exponential scale, so that a severity level 1 
failure has a cost of $1 per failure event, a severity level two has a cost of $10 per 
event, and so on.  Equations (2) and (3) define the conversion scales for frequency to 
number of expected failures and severity level to cost per failure event, respectively.   
                 
            
        (2) 
where: 
Nf = Number of expected failures per product per unit lifetime  




            
         
        (3) 
where: 
S = Severity level under consideration 
Cf,S = Cost per failure event at severity level S 
  
Equation (2) which takes the qualitative occurrence rating from a FMMEA 
and calculates expected number of failures, is just one method that someone could use 
to generate an expected number of failures to occur over a product’s service life.  One 
could also use physics-of-failure models or data-driven methods to obtain the 
expected number of failures. Applying the loading conditions to a physics-of-failure 
model of each FMMEA could be used to determine the expected number of failures.  
Similarly, if failure data for a certain set of conditions exists, that data could be used 
to obtain the expected number of failures.  For example, in the case study presented in 
Chapter 3, some of the failures calculate the expected number of failures using a 
Weibull distribution based on the number of thermal cycles the product or system is 
expected to experience over its service life.  Equation (4) calculates the chance a 
failure will occur using the cumulative distribution function of the Weibull 
distribution.   
       
 
      
 
  
            
        (4) 
where: 




F(c) = Value of the Weibull cumulative distribution function at c 
β = Weibull shape parameter 
η = Weibull scale parameter 
γ = Weibull location parameter 
 Using equation (4), we can now calculate the number of failures expected to 
occur over the service life of the product for failure listed in the FMMEA.   
 Now that the model has an expected number of occurrences for each failure 
severity, and a cost associated with each occurrence at every severity, the PCFC for 
the system can be calculated.  Figure 3 shows a plot of the expected number of 
failures and cost associated with each failure for five severity levels.  The vertical 
axis is the number of failures expected to occur per product per service life.  The 
service life is the required life the system, expressed in years or cycles.  The 
horizontal axis is the cost per failure event.  Figure 3 is clearer when the two axes are 
converted to log scales, as shown in Figure 4.  To further simplify the graph we 
represent the lines between severity levels as straight lines as shown in Figure 5.  For 
the remainder of this thesis graphs of failures will use log-log axes with straight line 
graphical simplifications, however, the analysis performed assumes that the plots look 















Figure 5: Expected number of failures vs. cost per failure graphed on 
logarithmic axes with straight line simplification 
 
 The cost and number of failures for each severity level are connected and 
form a curve.  The area under this curve is the PCFC for the system.  This area is the 
integral of the line connecting the points evaluated at from the point at severity level 
1 to the point at severity level 5.  The model determines the total area under the curve 
by calculating the area under the curve between consecutive severity levels, say 1 and 
2, and summing up all these discreet areas to obtain the PCFC for the entire system.  
Equation (5) describes the calculation of the overall PCFC: 
              ∫       
  
  
    
        (5) 
where: 
E1 = Expected number of severity level 1 failures 




n = Number of severity levels under consideration + 1 
C(x) = Cost of a failure event occurring at severity level x 
 
Note that this area represents the area under the curve in figure 3, where cost and 
severity of failure are graphed on linear axes.   
  
Since the PCFC is the area under the curve in Figure 4, the model calculates 
the PCFC by calculating the area under each trapezoid formed by the points in the 
curve and summing all the areas.  Equation (6) shows how to calculate the areas 
under all the trapezoids and Figure 6 illustrates Equation (6) in progress after it has 
calculated the area under the first two trapezoids.   
 
              ∑       (           )              (           )   (6) 
where: 
n = number of points on the curve + 1  
E(x) = Expected number of failures per product per unit lifetime of point (severity 
level) x on the curve 






Figure 6: Calculating the area curve by calculating the area under each 
trapezoid formed by the points on the curve 
2.5 Activities that Modify the Expected Number of Failures 
 
 Now that the PCFC for the system has been calculated, the activities that can 
potentially lower the cost of the system can be considered.  An activity is sub-process, 
process, or group of processes (or possibly technology or material) that when 
performed (or applied) changes the number of expected failures over the service life 
of the product.  Activities can be performed at multiple levels of rigor; rigor is the 
detail or depth at which the activity is performed.  Performing an activity at a higher 
level of rigor has the potential for a greater reduction in the number of expected 
failures, but it will cost more.   
Activities can affect specific failure modes, failure mechanisms, failure 
causes, and parts.  If an activity is defined to affect the mode, mechanism, cause, and 




level profile, then if that activity is performed, the number of expected failures will 
drop.  Equation (7) shows the calculation of the new expected number of failures after 
a number of activities are performed. 
 
           ∏        
 
           
           
where: 
Nf-f = Number of failures expected to occur over the service life of the product for a 
particular failure listed in a the FMMEA after considering activities 
Nf-i = Number of failures expected to occur over the service life of the product for a 
particular failure listed in a the FMMEA before considering activities 
PR (i, R) = Fractional reduction in the expected number of failures to occur over the 
service life of the product do to performing activity i 
m = Number of activities performed that affect the failure under consideration 
R = The level of rigor activity i is performed at 
 
In order to describe an activity to be used in the model, the user must define 
the reduction in failures over the service life of the product, the non-recurring (NRE) 
cost for each level of rigor, and state which failure modes, failure mechanisms, failure 
causes, and parts the activity will impact if performed.  Note that an activity can 
affect any number of modes, causes, mechanisms, and/or parts.  Table 6 shows a 




Table 7 shows a sample of modes, mechanisms, causes, and parts that an activity 
could impact.     
 
Table 6: Levels of rigor and corresponding reduction of failures and NRE cost 


































































The investment cost associated with an activity is the cost of performing the 




engineering (NRE) cost.   The user of the model specifies which activities to perform, 
and the levels of rigor at which activities are performed.  The cost of performing all 
activities, called the Total Implementation Cost, is calculated according to equation 
(8): 
                           ∑                    (8) 
where: 
i = the activity under consideration 
n = The number of activities being performed 
R = The level of rigor activity i is performed at 
C(i,R) = Cost of performing activity i at level of rigor R 
 
2.6 Calculating the Effect of Activities on the Expected Number of 
Failures 
 
 By performing activities, the user intends to reduce the number of failures the 
system will experience over one lifetime, in the hope of avoiding some of the costs 
associated with the occurrence of these failures.  As shown in Table 6, performing an 
activity at level of rigor R will reduce the number of times a failure is expected to 
occur.  However, the model determines which failures listed in the FMMEA each 
activity affects by checking if that failure’s mode, mechanism, cause, and part are 
impacted by the activity.  For example, consider the activity described by the 
characteristics in Tables 6 and 7 performed at a level of rigor of 3.  A failure 
described by the mode: Intermittent Open Circuit/ Cracked Solder Joint, cause: 




Through Hole Solder Joint- Large, would see its expected number of failures over one 
system service life reduced by 35% because all of four of its defining characteristics 
(mode, cause, mechanism, and part) are affected by the activity.
2
  But, a failure whose 
failure mechanism was Shock would see no reduction in its expected number of 
failures because the activity does not impact failures whose failure mechanism is 
Shock.  Equation (9) describes the calculation of the effect of activities: 
                         (9) 
where: 
NF,f = The number of failures expected to occur after the activity has been performed 
NF,i = The number of failures expected to occur before the activity has been 
performed 
PR = The fractional reduction of failures at level of rigor R, note that PR could be 
greater than one, meaning that an activity causes the number of expected failures to 
increase.   
 The model performs the calculation in equation (6) for each activity on every 
failure listed in the FMMEA whose mode, cause, mechanism, and part are all 
impacted by the activity.    
2.7 Calculating the PCFC after Activities have been Performed 
 
 Now that a set of activities has been described and implemented, the model 
once again calculates the PCFC for the system.  But, now that activities are 
considered, the expected number of failures the system will experience over one 
                                                          
2
 The fractional reduction of failures over product service life for this activity at level of rigor 3 is 0.65, 




lifetime may be lower due to the activities having been performed.  The failures listed 
in the FMMEA that have been affected by activities may have a lower expected 
number of failures than they did before activities were considered.   
 First the model calculates the number of failures expected to occur at each 
severity level, as outlined in equation (1), except now some of the failures are 
expected to occur fewer times over one product service life.  Using equation (1) the 
model generates the modified severity level profile, as shown in Table 8: 
Table 8: Modified expected number of failures at each severity level 
 
 
Next, the model uses the new expected number of failures to calculate expected 
PCFC of the system using equation (10).   
Modified       ∫       
    
    
      (10) 
where: 
E1-f = Expected number of severity level 1 failures after activities are considered 
En-f = Expected number of severity level n failures after activities are considered 




C(x) = cost of a failure event occurring at x 
 
Now that the modified PCFC has been determined, the difference between the initial 
PCFC and the modified PCFC, called the Reduction in Failure Cost is calculated.  
Equation (11) defines the calculation: 
                           Initial PCFC – Modified PCFC         (11) 
 
The Reduction in Failure Cost can be graphically represented as the difference in the 
areas under the curves in 7.  The top curve is the expected number of failures versus 
PCFC before activities are considered, and the bottom curve is the expected numbers 
of failures versus PCFC after activities are considered.  In Figure 8, the reduction in 
area under the curves is shaded.   
 
Figure 7: The blue (top) curve represents the number of failures per product per 
unit lifetime at each severity level before activities are considered, and the red 
(bottom) line represents the number of expected failures after activities are 





Figure 8:  The area between the curves is the reduction in expected PCFC to be 
incurred per product per unit lifetime 
 
2.8 Calculating Return on Investment  
 
 The final step in the model is to calculate the Return on Investment or ROI.  
The ROI is defined as the difference between return and investment divided by 
investment.  In the case of this model, the investment is the money spent on 
performing activities, the Total Implementation Cost, and the return is the PCFC that 
will be avoided because activities have been performed, the Reduction in Failure 
Cost.  Equation (12) defines ROI in terms of this thesis: 
 
 
                           
                 






                                                   
                         
   
      (12) 
 
2.9 Uncertainty in the Model 
 
 The model is designed to handle several types of uncertainty.  The model 
allows for uncertainty in the effectiveness of activities, the number of failures 
expected to occur over the service life at each severity level, and the cost of 
performing activities.    
The effectiveness of activities is defined by equation (9).  In equation (6) the 
fractional reduction of failures, PR, is a fraction (usually between 0 and 1, but not 
necessarily because an activity could make a product more likely to fail) that is 
multiplied with the initial number of failures to calculate the final number of failures 
after the activity has been performed.  However, a person using this model might be 
uncertain over how effective the activities will be at reducing the number of failures, 
and hence uncertain in the value of PR for each activity.  To account for uncertainty, 
the model allows PR to be defined as a distribution.  For example, PR could be a 
triangular distribution with a mode of 0.50, a low value of 0.25, and a high value of 
0.75.   
 Similarly, one could also define the number of failures expected to occur over 
one service life of the system and the cost of performing an activity as a distribution.  
Thus, in one run of the model, the model samples the distributions defining certain 




many trials (each trial could represent one instance of the system) a range of values 
for the ROI is obtained representing the value of the activities to the population of 
systems.  Figure 9 shows an example where the model has been run 10 times with 
uncertainties.  Note that there is uncertainty in the blue curves because the number of 
expected failures before activities are applied is uncertain, and there is uncertainty in 
the red curves because the effectiveness of activities is uncertain.  Figure 10 shows 
the resulting histogram of ROIs from 1000 trials.   
 
Figure 9: Results of 10 trials when certain parameters in the model are 











 The model developed in this thesis was constructed on a spreadsheet and 


























Chapter 3: Lead-Free Solder Control Plan Case Study 
 
On July 1, 2006 the European Union’s Restriction of Hazardous Substances 
(RoHS) Directive and Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive 
went into effect, banning the use of lead in electronics and electrical equipment.  
Mueller et al. (2005) outlines environmental and technological issues associated with 
using lead-free solder in electronic assemblies.  Removing lead from electronics is 
generally perceived to benefit the environment and society because electronics often 
end up in landfills when they are discarded, and the public fears that lead from 
discarded parts will contaminate groundwater.  As a result of banning lead, non-
traditional solders such as SnCu must be used in electronics.  Therefore, product 
developers must qualify their products (and processes) when replacing tin-lead 
(SnPb) solder with lead-free solder (e.g., SnCu): 
“Reliability testing becomes necessary for compliance with the needs of the product 
manufacturers and users and have to be carried out to identify the sources of errors 
caused by the many new material combinations with their intermetallics, unknown 
material behavior at the higher soldering temperatures and the whisker 
phenomenonon Sn plated surfaces” (Mueller et al. 2005). 
 
Mueller et al. also describes the dangers of tin whiskers and the need for more 
research to prevent the whiskers from creating short circuits when tin platings are 
used.   
Considerable work has been done on predicting the reliability of lead-free solder used 
in solder joints.  Lau et al. (2003) defines reliability of a solder joint as “the 
probability that the solder joint will perform its intended function for a specified 
period of time, under a given operating condition, without failure” (Lau et al. 2003).   




His models can be used to predict the reliability and useful life of a lead-free solder 
joint.  Accelerated testing simulates the stresses that are expected to occur over the 
service life of the product in a short period of time.  Additionally, Kregting et al. 
(2012) models the reliability of lead-free solder joints through virtual design 
qualification, where accelerated testing of solder joints is simulated with computer 
models.  The Kregting et al. and Lau et al. models predict the reliability of lead-free 
solder through accelerated testing.  Their focus is on projecting how a product 
performs when lead-free solder is used in the place of tin-lead solder.  
In this chapter, the model developed in Chapter 2 will be used to project the 
cost implications of implementing a lead-free solder control plan on a power supply 
whose manufacturer has recently changed from using tin-lead solder to lead-free 
solder.  The case study will analyze the system under two sets of conditions:  in one 
situation the power supply is used in desktop computers and in the other situation the 
power supply is used in a commercial aircraft.   
3.1 Lead-Free Control Plan Background 
 
 The performance and reliability of electronic parts is of great concern to the 
aerospace industry, and the problem of transitioning to from tin-lead solder to lead-
free solder is particularly difficult for aerospace applications for a number of reasons.  
First, avionics and other electronic systems in aerospace systems often operate in 
extreme environments, exposed to temperature extremes, high altitudes, and shocks 
(Pinsky et al. 2008).  Also, unlike consumer electronics that have service lives of 




the consequences of failure in aerospace systems are dire, including loss of life and 
great financial losses.   
 Given the high stakes of electronic performance in aerospace systems, the 
Aerospace Industries Association created the Pb-Free Electronics Risk Management 
Consortium (PERM) to provide guidance and leadership to the aerospace industry 
and respond to the challenges posed by the use of lead-free solder in aerospace and 
defense applications.  As Pinsky states, the goal of the lead-free control plan is to 
“document processes that assure the Plan owners, their customers, and all other 
stakeholders that aerospace and high performance high-reliability electronics systems 
will continue to be reliable, safe, producible, affordable, and supportable” (Pinsky et 
al. 2008).    
 A lead-free control plan defines the reliability objectives of a system, outlines 
all the risks that are threats to achieving those requirements, and defines the processes 
that will be performed to ensure the stakeholders’ reliability requirements are met.  In 
the context of this thesis, the processes of the lead-free control plan are called 
activities (defined in Section 2.6 of this thesis).  In the context of the case study 
presented in this chapter, the lead-free control plan defines a set of activities that the 
user may implement with the goal of improving the reliability of the system so that it 
meets all stakeholders’ reliability requirements.  Also, some activities may be 
required by industry standards or law, but the user may have a choice as to the level 
of rigor that they are performed with and whether to perform other activities that are 




 The control plan used in this thesis for the case study in this chapter is based 
on the standards and practices outlined by the PERM.  The activities of the case study 
are detailed in Section 3.7.   
3.2 Power Supply Description 
 
 We wish to test the applicability of the model developed in Chapter 2 by 
applying it to a case study that evaluates the value (or lack of value) associated with a 
control plan for lead-free solder implementation in a power supply.  In this case 
study, we will analyze a power supply from a desktop personal computer.  We 
consider the hypothetical situation that the manufacturer of the computer power 
supply must, due to new regulation, use lead-free solder instead of tin-lead solder.  
Changing solder is difficult for the manufacturer because a new solder may affect the 
reliability of the power supply, and less data exists on the performance of lead-free 
solder than tin-lead solder.   
 Specifically, this case study uses a Dell power supply (Model: NPS-250KB) 
with a variable 100-120V – 9.0 A / 200-240V – 4.5 input and 5V – 22.0A / 12V – 
14.0A output.  Figure 11 shows the power supply.  Figure 12 shows the power 
supply’s components attached to the printed circuit board (PCB) and Figure 13 shows 
the solder connections, both through hole and surface mount, on the reverse of the 


















Figure 13: Solder connections on the reverse of the PCB 
 
For a detailed list of solder connections, see Table 10.   
 To conduct the case study, we must first create a FMMEA for the power 
supply.  The FMMEA used in this case study is based on two existing failure analyses 
on power supply failure modes, mechanisms, and causes: one on power supply 
voltage regulations by Matthew et al. (2012) and one on power supply cooling units 
(fans) by Oh et al. (2010).  The analyses in the Matthew et al. and Oh et al. were used 
to construct a comprehensive FMMEA for the power supply, which is not shown in 






3.3 Scope of the Lead-free Case Study 
 
 Using the FMMEA, the model calculates the projected cost of failure 
consequences (PCFC) for all of the failures that are expected to occur during the 
service life of the product (or fleet of products).  Additionally, several proposed 
activities that have the potential to reduce the probability of failures occurring are 
described (these are the activities in the control plan).  If an activity reduces the 
number of failures, then PCFC will be reduced.  Then, various combinations of these 
activities are tested in the model in an attempt to determine the best combination of 
control plan activities that fulfills the system owner’s reliability and cost 
requirements.  It is important to note that the goal of the case study is to analyze and 
optimize the  lead-free solder control plan activities, not to analyze the decision to 
convert the power supply to lead-free solder.  We assume that the owner has already 
made the decision to transition to lead-free, or that its transition is required by outside 
factors.    
For this case study, we are interested in analyzing the cost implications of 
lead-free control plan activities on the power supply.  Since we assume our activities 
only affect lead-free parts, we do not have to consider all failures listed in the 
comprehensive FMMEA.  Instead, we will only consider the failures associated with 
the solder connections of the parts to the PCB.  Table 9categorizes the solder 
connections on the PCB by type of connection and the parts connected to the PCB.   
 
 
Table 9: Solder connections on the power supply PCB 
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0 0 0 1 
 
In the FMMEA, solder connections failures are classified based on the circuit 
element connected, the size of the connection, and the type of solder connection 
(through hole or surface mount).  For example, in this FMMEA, large through-hole 
solder joints connecting capacitors are one distinct “part.  Three failures modes are 
associated with each part in the FMMEA, where a part is a set of solder connections 
with a distinct size, type, and circuit element being connected.  Open circuits and 
intermittent open circuit failure modes are associated with failure cause and 
mechanism temperature cycling and fatigue, respectively.  The short circuit mode is 
associated with a failure cause of conductive bridge and failure mechanism of fatigue.  
The difference between an intermittent open circuit and a “non-intermittent” open 
circuit is that an intermittent open circuit will close after a period of time, and that a 
“non-intermittent” open circuit stays open until maintenance is performed.  In this 




severe that failures associated with permanent open circuits.  The subsection of the 
FMMEA used for the case study is shown in Table 10: 
 
































































































































































































































































































3.4 Case Study Environmental and Operating Conditions, and 
Consequences of Failure 
 
 This case study will analyze the cost implications of implementing a lead-free 
control plan on the power supply after its manufacturer has recently switched from 
using leaded solder to lead-free solder for two cases: one where the power supply is 
used in a desktop computer; and the other where the power supply is used in a 
commercial aircraft.  These cases differ in several aspects.  First, the environmental 
conditions of each are very different.  A desktop computer is in an environment that is 
assumed to have stable temperatures, pressure, and humidity, while in an aircraft 
these conditions vary greatly.  Additionally, we are assuming that the power supply 
on the aircraft is operating in the unpressurized, non-climate controlled, tail of the 
aircraft, colloquially (and quite aptly) known as the “hell hole.” The conditions in the 




the IPC outlines the worst case temperature change for one thermal cycle (one flight) 
to be 20 degrees C, actual field data shows that temperatures can range up to 40 
degrees C in flight.   
Also, the power supply may have different service lives and rates of use 
depending on its application.  For this case study, we assume that while a typical 
commercial aircraft can have an expected service life of 20 years or more, this power 
supply will only be in use for 5 years, and then it will be replaced.  Also, we assume 
that the power supply is part of a safety critical component of the aircraft, but that a 
redundant identical power supply exists.  Thus if the power supply fails the redundant 
power supply takes over operation.  However, if the failure of the power supply is 
severe enough to render the power supply non-operational, then the aircraft is not 
allowed to fly again until corrective action is taken, i.e., both the power supply and its 
redundant power supply must be operational to fly again.  The wait time for 
corrective action could result in significant financial consequences for the aircraft 
operator.  Alternatively, we assume that when the power supply is used in a PC it has 
an expected service life of 5 years.  When the power supply is used in a desktop 
computer, it is assumed that it will experience on average 1 temperature cycle per 
week, as the computer is turned on and off only periodically.  When used in an 
aircraft, we assume the power supply will experience one temperature cycle per 
flight, and that the aircraft is making an average of 6 flights per operational day, and 
that it operates 300 days per year.  Table 11 summarizes the operational expectations 




Secondly, the consequences of failure for a power supply in an aircraft will be 
far greater than for a power supply in a desktop computer.  Note that in the context of 
this thesis, we consider the consequences of failure in terms of the financial loss to 
the entity responsible for the performance of the system, such as warranty claims, 
lawsuits, and loss of potential profits.  This entity will incur a financial loss if system 
failures occur.  We are assuming that this is obligated to keep the system operational 
for a predetermined service life, so if a failure occurs the owner must pay to resolve 
any consequences resulting from that failure and pay money to repair or replace the 
system so it can continue to operate until the end of its set service life.  This entity 
could be the operator of the system, or the manufacturer of the system if it is under a 
warranty that requires the manufacturer to pay for all consequences of failure during 
the warranty period.  In the latter case, the service life of the system would be defined 
as the warranty period.  In Table 11, the use conditions (temperature cycles per year) 
and service life are shown for both applications of the power supply.  For the PC case, 
we assume the entity responsible for failure costs is the manufacturer, and the PC is 
under warranty for the service life (five years).  In the commercial aircraft case, we 
assume the entity responsible for failure costs is an airline (the system operator).  
Table 12 shows the assumed consequences and likelihoods of varying severity and 
occurrence ratings of failure when the power supply used in a desktop PC and Table 
13 shows the assumed consequences and likelihoods of varying severity and 





Table 11: Comparison of the usage conditions for the application of the power 
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   In this case study we assume that all repair and replace maintenance actions 
result in a good-as-new part returning to the soccer.  However, this assumption may 
not be entirely accurate, as repair of solder joints performed by humans can result in 
less than good-as-new joints, in the case of tin whiskers or open circuits.   
 Also, the minor nuisance failure event could be a no fault found failure event.  




(severity level one) do not change if multiple no fault found events occur on the same 
board.  But, some companies in industry have policies limiting boards to three no 
fault found events.  These companies require that if a board has three no fault found 
events, and the underlying cause is discovered, the board is thrown out.  Adapting 
these policies to the model would mean that a third severity level one event on a 
particular board would actually be a severity level three event; however that case is 
not modeled in this case study.   
3.5 Lead–Free Control Plan Activities  
 
 The purpose of a lead-free control plan is to ensure that a product or system 
that transitions from tin-lead solder to lead-free solder will meet its reliability 
requirements when using lead-free solder.  The lead-free control plan is a set of 
activities that a manufacturer can choose to perform to ensure reliability requirements 
are met.  Performing activities qualifies the product or its manufacturing processes.  
Activities are paid for before they are performed, so the manufacturer pays money 
prior to making the product with the aim of reducing failure costs that will be 
incurred over the product service life.   
There are several activities that the user may choose to implement for this 
case study.  The activities can be applied to both applications of the power supply (in 
a desktop computer or commercial aircraft).  Table 14 shows the six activities the 








Additionally the user has the choice to perform or not perform each activity in 
the control plan.  Additionally, each activity can be performed at various levels of 
rigor.  For example, the cost and benefit details for the activity “Risk and limitations 




Table 13: Cost and benefit data for various levels of rigor of performing the 
activity “Risk and limitations of use” (NRE = non-recurring) 
 
3.6 Case Study Results 
 
 In this section the model is applied to the power supply, first where the power 
supply is used in a PC, and second where the power supply is used in an aircraft.  For 
both scenarios we assume that the consequences of failure of the power supply are 
given in Tables 11 and 12, and that all activities from the lead-free control plan are 
performed.  Every solder joint on the circuit board of the power supply is assumed to 
use SAC305 solder is modeled with a Weibull distribution.  The β parameters used in 
the Weibull distributions are based off of the testing done by George et al. (2012) and 
Wang (2011), however, no good data could be found on the characteristic life (η) of 
SAC305 solder for the conditions in the case study.  Each activity is performed at a 
level of rigor of 3, and we have assumed that the cost and benefit of each activity 
performed in this case study is the same as the activity “Risk and limitations of use” 




work published by Rifat (2008).  Each application of the power supply was run for 
100 trials.  Each trial calculates the initial PCFC by sampling the Weibull 
distributions for each part.   
In this thesis, each solder joint on the power supply represents a socket (a 
place where a part goes).  Each socket must complete the number of cycles as defined 
by the service life.  If a solder joint does not last for its service life then it is assumed 
that corrective action is taken (repair or replace) and the socket samples the Weibull 
again until the cumulative lives (in cycles) of the parts in the socket are greater than 
or equal to the service life (also in cycles).  Then each trial calculates: an investment 
cost (the cost of performing activities) by sampling the cost distribution defining the 
cost of performing the activity at the severity level chosen, a return (the reduction in 
PCFC after performing activities) by sampling the distribution defining the fractional 
reduction in failures for each activity performed and applying the factional reduction 
in failures to the failures in the FMMEA that the activity affects, and an ROI.  
Calculations are described in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  Thus, for each trial, 
the initial PCFC, investment cost, and return could be different because the 
parameters that determine them are defined as distributions that are sampled for each 
trial.   
3.6.1 Desktop Computer Case Study 
 
 In this section, the model is run in the case of applying the lead free control 
plan to a power supply used in a desktop computer.  Because the characteristic life of 




values of the solder characteristic life: 25,000, 50,000, and 75,000 cycles.  The results 
of the case study are shown in Figures 14 to 19, where the blue lines represent the 
system before the lead-free control plan activities are performed, and the red lines 
represent the system after the lead-free control plan activities are performed.  Note 
that while 100 trials were performed, Figures 14, 66, and 18 only show the graphical 
results of the first 15 trials.  Figures 15, 17, and 19 show a histogram of the 100 ROIs 
that were calculated for the 100 trials.   
 The actual numbers generated for the first trial of the PC case where η = 
50,000 cycles where as follows: PCFC (for a population of 100,000 PCs) before 
activities are performed: $6,500,000, cost of performing activities: $17,454,122, 
PCFC after activities are performed: $2,804,656, reduction in PCFC due to 









Figure 15: Histogram of ROIs, η = 25,000 cycles 
 
BLUE: System Prior to 
Performing Activities 






Figure 16: Results for the PC case where η = 50,000 cycles 
 
 






Figure 18: Results for the PC case where η = 75,000 cycles 
 
Figure 19: Histogram of ROIs, η = 75,000 cycles 
In two of the cases (η = 75,000 and 50,000) the median ROI is negative, because the 




activities in of 90% of the trials.  But, when η = 25,000, the initial PCFC is so great 
that paying for activities to reduce it is cost effective.      
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Case Study 
 
 Next we perform the case study again for a fleet of commercial aircraft.  All 
parameters are the same in this case study as for the PC, except that the PCFC 
associated with each severity level of failure is much greater because the power 
supply is being used in an airplane, which is a safety critical system, and the service 
life of the aircraft is 20 years.  As in the PC case study, the study is run three times for 
varying values of the characteristic life of the solder. Figures 20 to 25 show the 





Figure 20: Results for the commercial aircraft case where η = 25,000 cycles 
 
 






Figure 22: Results for the commercial aircraft case where η =50,000 cycles 
 
 





Figure 24: Results for the commercial aircraft case where η =75,000 cycles 
 
 







 Table 16 shows the minimum, median, and maximum values of ROI for each 
of the 6 runs of the model.   
Table 14: ROI Values 
 
 
For this example, the model shows that performing activities provides more value in 
the commercial aircraft scenario than the PC scenario.  Performing activities is only 
valid for the PC scenario when the solder has the lowest value of η.  When the power 
supply is used in an aircraft, there is a good case for performing activities in all three 
scenarios, but when η = 75,000, there is a chance that performing activities will result 
in a negative ROI.   
3.8 Other Scenarios 
 
 Now we change other variables to test the model.  In each of the following 
scenarios, model is run on the commercial aircraft scenario with η = 50,000 cycles.   





 In the six previous cases, all activities were performed at the 3
rd
 level of rigor 
but for this simulation we perform them at rigor level 5.  The results are shown in 
Figures 26 and 27.   
 
Figure 26: Results for Commercial Aircraft case where η =50,000 cycles, 





Figure 27: Histogram of ROIs, η = 50,000 cycles, activities performed at the 
highest level of rigor 
 
The median ROI when all activities we performed at level of rigor 3 is 239% and the 
median ROI when activities are performed at level of rigor 5 is 265%.  There is not 
much change in ROI because the additional benefits of performing activities at a 
higher level of rigor cost more to attain.   
3.8.2 Activities are not Independent 
 
 In every previous case, we have assumed that activities are independent, 
implying that  if multiple activities that affect the same mode, mechanism, cause, or 
part are performed, the full benefit of each activity is received.  Now we assume that 
performing multiple activities reduces the benefit of performing other activities that 
affect the same mode, mechanism, cause, or part.  In this scenario, we assume that the 
user performs all activities (because he or she is required to do so by law or 




mechanism, cause, or part, performing additional activities has no effect on that 
mode, mechanism, cause, or part.  Two simulations were run, one with activities 
performed at the 3
rd
 level of rigor and the other with activities performed at the 5
th
 
level of rigor.  Figure 28 through 31 show the results.   
 
Figure 28: Results for Commercial Aircraft case where η =50,000 cycles, 





Figure 29: Histogram of ROIs, η = 50,000 cycles, activities performed at level of 
rigor 3, activities are not independent 
 
Figure 30: Results for the commercial aircraft case where η =50,000 cycles, 





Figure 31: Histogram of ROIs, η = 50,000 cycles, activities performed at the 
highest level of rigor, activities are not independent 
The median ROI when activities are not independent and performed at level of rigor 3 
is 4%, and when activities are performed at level of rigor 5 is 175%.  Clearly, when 
activities are not independent, their effectiveness is reduced.   
3.9 Conclusions 
 
 The case studies presented in this chapter are meant to show the applicability 
and potential value of the model.  They are not meant to create any real world 
conclusions, as some of the values in the studies are best estimates.  But, the case 
studies show that if a person had reliable data on a system and potential activities, he 
or she could draw powerful conclusions.   
 Also, the case studies show the flexibility of the model.  It can handle cases 
where activities are assumed to be independent or not independent of each other.  The 
model can also account for uncertainty in the number of failures to occur over the 




activities.  The model uses Monte Carlo techniques to sample the uncertainties over a 









 Adoption and insertion of new technologies and processes into systems is 
inherently risky.  An assessment of the cost of risk may be a necessary part of 
planning or building a business case to change a system.  A cost model that forecasts 
the cost of risk associated with inserting new technology into a system has been 
developed.  The model projects the cost of inserting new processes, projects the 
impact of the processes on the cost of risk for the system, and performs a cost-benefit 
analysis on the adoption of proposed new processes.  The projected cost of failure 
consequences (PCFC) is defined as the cost of all failure events (of varying severity) 
that are expected to occur over the service life of the system.  The PCFC is uncertain, 
and the potential positive impact of adopting new technologies into the system is to 
reduce the cost of risk and/or reduce its uncertainty.   
A case study that assesses the adoption of a lead-free solder control plan 
(required by customers) into systems that previously used tin-lead solder has been 
performed.  The case study analyzed the application of the model for two 
applications: a personal computer (PC) and commercial aircraft.  This case study was 
performed to show that if one had accurate data on the PCFC for a system, the cost of 
performing various activities, and the benefit of performing the same activities, a 
judgment could be made, with a quantifiable level of certainty, as to if performing 
some or all of the activities will be cost-effective.  In the case study performed for 
this thesis, performing activities was far more cost effective when the power supply 




had a greater service life requirement and higher financial consequences of failure 
when used in an aircraft.  The power supply is projected to fail more often over its 
service life in an aircraft and the entities responsible for the performance of the power 
supply incur more cost when the power supply fails, hence there is more benefit to 
spending money to reduce the expected number of failures.   
4.2 Contributions 
 
 This thesis developed a model that calculates the projected cost of failure 
consequences for a system (PCFC).  The model also calculates the cost of performing 
various activities that have the potential to reduce the PCFC, and a return on 
investment for performing activities.  The model links reliability and cost of failure 
events, and is capable of handling uncertainty in both.  Although previous models use 
severity of failure and likelihood of failure to forecast a cost of quality, risk, failure, 
or reliability, the model in this thesis not only calculates a cost of failure (defined as 
PCFC in this thesis), it calculates the reduction in the PCFC when activities are 
performed and an ROI for performing activities. The model can handle activities 
performed at various levels of rigor.   
 The model was used in a case study to assess the financial consequences of 
performing various activities associated with a lead-free control plan. This model 
develops a framework that allows the assessment of the cost impact of implementing 
a lead-free control plan.  This thesis provides the first ability to determine the 




control plan.  It can be used to run studies to provide justification for performing or 
not performing activities in a lead-free control plan.   
4.3 Future Work 
 
 The interaction between activities needs to be considered and modeled in 
more depth.  The current model assumes that activities are completely independent, 
that is performing one activity does not affect the benefit associated with performing 
another.  But, this may not be the case, since multiple activities may impact the same 
failure mechanism.  The architecture of the model can accommodate narrowly 
defining the application of activities to specific parts, specific modes, specific 
mechanisms, and/or specific parts; however, the model can only assume either the 
best case, independence of activity impacts, or the worst case, once one activity is 
performed on a specific mode, mechanism, or cause of failure for a specific part 
performing additional activities that affect the same mode, mechanism, or cause on 
the part results in no additional benefit.   
 Redundancy in systems needs to be accommodated.  In the aircraft case study 
in this thesis, the power supply is assumed to be redundant with another identical 
power supply, and if the power supply being modeled fails the other power supply 
immediately takes over.  We model various failure events where the power supply is 
repaired or replaced during scheduled maintenance, and we also model failures that 
are so severe that aircraft cannot take-off because the power supply needs to be 
replaced before scheduled maintenance, as there need to be two operational power 




power supply fails, the other kicks in, and then the redundant power supply also fails 
in the same flight.  This is a situation that has very low probability, but one that 
should be considered if all potential failure events were to be modeled.   This could 
be modeled by a discrete event simulator that models every flight an airplane takes 
over its service life and checks if the second redundant power supply fails after it 
takes over.   
 Further work needs to be done on modeling the solder joints on the board 
under real usage conditions.  As of now, the Weibull parameters are estimates based 
on existing studies conducted under accelerated testing conditions, however, one 
could use calcePWA to model the parts on the board under actual usage conditions.  
Using calcePWA will give us failure data specific to the circuit board, and under 
actual application-specific usage conditions.   
 Additional work needs to be performed to verify the model.  The case study 
presented in this thesis shows the applicability of the model, but verification requires 
further studies.  One way to verify the model would be to perform a case study on 
technology that was implemented into a system and saved money by reducing failure 
consequences in the past.  This would have to be a real-life situation from industry 
where the results are already known.  The model could be run with numbers from the 
past technology insertion problem, and the model would be verified if it reaches the 
same conclusion as the real-life scenario.  To do this, one would run the model in the 
hypothetical scenario before technology was inserted, and then see if its projections 
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